constitutional settlement. Similarly to Dani I am rather sceptical of its compatibility with the core commitments of constitutional democracy, but at the same time remain ambivalent when it comes to its indispensability for the health of constitutional democracy in Europe. (4) Finally, I suggest what the solution to the constitutional courts' current predicament can be: the greater emphasis on the distinction between ordinary and constitutional legality and greater institutional responsibility of ordinary courts in maintaining it.
Shall we fear the 'rights-revolution' in Europe?
I will start with the point regarding fundamental rights, raised by both replies to my article. I fully share Dani's criticism that the '[t]alk of revolution, …, is exaggerated and, probably, deceiving'.
3 I did not want to suggest by that expression a deep structural 're-foundation' of the EU legal order or a significant reorientation of its legal discourse. I used the term 'revolution' only in order to highlight the rise of preliminary references concerning fundamental rights by national ordinary courts. In my view this numerically significant phenomenon explains why the ECJ's 'doctrine of displacement' of national constitutional courts started to bite only relatively recently. It is the consequences of such references for the structure of the national constitutional democracy that I am concerned with most and to which I give normative importance. 4 That, in essence, would be my reply to Mair and Deutscher too: of course I know that the doctrines, which I have labelled as 'displacing' constitutional courts from national and European politics, were established a long time ago.
5 But I would insist that they started to bite national constitutional courts only relatively recently -as evidenced by the growing academic interest in the topic and the very cases that concern constitutional courts' relationship to ordinary courts -all emerging only recently. One needs to distinguish between existing doctrines in EU law, which are indeed, 'not new at all', 6 and their actual effect on the domestic constitutional structures that gives rise to concerns, which I tried to identify in my article. This effect is due to the developments in European integration that came much later after the rulings mentioned by Mair and Deutscher.
Mair and Deutscher further question my reading of 'the notorious duo Åkerberg Fransson and

Melloni'
7 as contributing 'significantly to the marginalisation of national constitutional courts'. 8 They delve admirably into the ECJ's decisions that followed these two judgments in order to argue that my fear of displacement is misguided. Here I would offer a methodological point: in my article I was mainly concerned with national ordinary courts' (mis)use of the displacement doctrines in order to challenge the authority of their domestic courts. For them the largely inconsistent case law of the Court, some contained in mere orders rejecting preliminary references, analysed by Mair and Deutscher, does not mean much. In national 3 Dani, n 1, [10] . 4 ordinary courts' operation, it is the "grands arrêts" of the Court that matter. 9 And until the Court announces clearly -in a grand chamber judgment -that the approach taken in Fransson and Melloni is reconsidered, the former will be taken to represent the ECJ's doctrine as it stands. 10 Moreover, when Mair and Deutscher claim that 'the Court's interpretation of [Article 53 of the EU Charter in Melloni] does not deviate from its approach to national standards of protection in its pre-Charter case law', 11 they point to what is exactly problematic about the Court. As many people have observed, the Court most of the time opts for the most expansionary ('pro-integrationist') interpretation of EU law. 12 While some people believed that Article 53 of the EU Charter 'threaten[ed] the supremacy of [EU] law', 13 in actuality the Court used it to confirm the absolute nature of the principle -later confirmed in its Opinion on the Accession of the EU to the ECHR.
14 To rely on the same rationale as the Court did thirty years ago in Hauer 15 (seemingly praised by Mair and Deutscher) does not suggest sensitivity to the changed political and constitutional context of European integration, but rather a blind adherence to interpretive principles originating in times when EU law did not matter (much) in domestic politics and did not provoke so much opposition as it does today.
At the same time, however, I would not dismiss the revolutionary potential of what Dani calls 'rights-recalibration', whereby the 'Union undertakes fundamental rights protection … to humanize its institutional framework by recalibrating its regulatory projects in the light of this new legal and political culture'. 16 My concern is that this recalibration will not lead to the constitutionalisation of the EU, 17 but to the submission of fundamental rights to the logic of the supranational project. This is exemplified by the ECJ's Opinion on the Accession of the EU to the ECHR. 18 The Court firstly emphasises that '[t]he autonomy enjoyed by EU law in relation to the laws of the Member States and in relation to international law requires that the interpretation of those fundamental rights be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the EU'. 19 The Court then explains what these objectives are: 'The pursuit of the EU's objectives, as set out in Article 3 TEU, is entrusted to a series of fundamental provisions, such as those providing for the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons, citizenship of the Union, the area of freedom, security and justice, and competition policy'. 20 I would suggest that free trade is (thus far) certainly not the central objective of any national constitutions, since life is about many more things than free market and trade. 21 Finally, as I argue elsewhere, EU fundamental rights are not embedded in a political system that provides for open contestation over the objectives to be pursued by its institutions, but is instead tied in a straitjacket formally amendable by the Member States, but in reality isolated from any meaningful political contestation. 22 And that is the true reason for worry, in my view: unless the EU becomes itself a constitutional democracy, its fundamental rights will serve not an emancipatory ideal of the latter, but the neoliberal goal of submitting national democratic process to the demands of unfettered globalism and marketization. 23 The few examples of the EU legislator's engagement with the ECJ's rulings, offered by Mair and Deutscher, cannot change this bleak view. 24 They represent most of the time modest modifications rather than radical overturns, which are simply almost impossible to adopt in the so diverse Union. The quote from Mair and Deutscher speaks in my view against their argument. They refer to a recent analysis of 22 legislative proposals, which identified 'alongside 13 codifications, 5 modifications, 3 non-adoptions and 1 override of the Court's case law by the EU legislator'.
25 I read these numbers as showing that while it may be possible for the EU legislator to negotiate the (a very limited) extent to which national social policy must give way to the requirements of the free movement law, 26 the fact remains that the market reins. Attempts to exempt certain domains from the reach of legal integration remain most of the time futile. 
Fundamental boundaries: the market and politics
This relates to the perhaps most fundamental critique raised by Mair and Deutscher against my article. It focuses on the conceptual framework of my article -the idea of European Constitutional Democracy, based on the balance -or better put, the process of negotiationbetween private and public autonomy. 28 I am said to argue that the ECJ's 'bias in favour of private autonomy, to the detriment of public autonomy, can best be balanced by national constitutional courts, due to their traditional public autonomy focus'. 29 They add, without attributing this view to me:
Traditionally, individuals' private autonomy is protected on the basis of fundamental rights, as such rights protect citizens against abusive governmental power. By contrast, 20 Ibid, paragraph 172. 21 25 Mair/Deutscher, n 1, 9. 26 And this still to a very limited extent. 27 See e.g. Loïc Azoulai, 'The "Retained Powers" Formula in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice: EU Law as Total Law? (2011) 4 European Journal of Legal Studies 192-219. 28 Mair/Deutscher, n 1, Section 3. 29 Ibid, [10] . public autonomy is traditionally linked with the idea of protecting the general interest through means of public policy. 30 The distinction between private and public autonomy is indeed crucial for my understanding of constitutional democracy. It encapsulates a tension, which far transcends the context of constitutional courts and adjudication in Europe. It is a tension between individuality and communality, our 'desire to be autonomous and the desire to be a participant in a common venture'. 31 In jurisprudence it was made famous by Duncan Kennedy, who saw it as a 'fundamental contradiction' of the liberal conception of law. 32 The contradiction was adopted by many 'crits' in the United States, despite that Kennedy later 'renounced' it, 33 and lies at the heart of Maarti Koskenniemi's revolutionary study of legal argument in international law.
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More broadly speaking it has been articulated in various debates on justice (between 'liberals' and 'communitarians'), 35 on freedom (where it relates to the distinction between liberal or negative freedom and different versions of political or social freedom), 36 or selfdetermination. 37 In post-war European constitutional law it is visible in the conception of rights, which are always balanced against each other and also some fundamental common interest, although the core of the right must always be protected.
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Speaking of the role of positive theory of public law, Martin Loughlin somewhat sceptically observed that its objective 'can only be that of developing the most effective apparatus we can that acknowledges the power of these competing claims. And since this disjuncture between freedom and belonging can be neither eliminated nor reconciled, it can only be negotiated'. 39 One way of analysing legitimacy is to see how this tension is negotiated in concrete institutional settings -since the tension cannot be displaced, no matter how much some proceduralists would want it so. 40 To borrow from Christoph Möllers' study of the principle of separation of powers, where public autonomy refers to democratic self-determination and private autonomy to individual self-determination: both forms of legitimacy are not only equally valuable, but mutually dependent and reinforcing. The justificatory capacities of individual and democratic procedures do not operate at the expense of one another. Democratic and individual legitimacy do not play in a zero sum game. The democratic process can claim legitimacy only if the rules that guarantee equal participation are observed. Inversely, the scope of individual liberties needs a democratic procedure because it potentially concerns everybody. As a result, any 30 Ibid, [11] . 31 41 With this broader context in mind it should be clear that I do not attribute one form of autonomy to exclusively one institution (such as private autonomy to the ECJ and public autonomy to constitutional courts); what I am concerned with is the existence of an institutional structure that allows for negotiation between private and public autonomy and the legitimation of public authority in terms of both. In this way I connect the idea of European Constitutional Democracy to the theory of constitutional pluralism. 42 And indeed, I do not believe that the institutional structure of the EU, if taken in opposition to rather than in conjunction with domestic structures falls short of this demand. By 'domestic structures' I do not mean constitutional courts only, but the whole edifice of a constitutional democracy, although my argument focused on the former, since they seemed to me marginalised in the debate that focused on national parliaments.
It can be true that on its face, it can seem that 'the balancing between individual fundamental rights and a genuinely European interest, lies at the very heart of the [ECJ]'s fundamental rights case law over the last four decades'. 43 The problem is, however, that in my view it is difficult to identify the 'genuinely European interest', other than rhetorically covering various deep social conflicts between the 'centre' and the 'periphery' of the Union, where 'the "universal" of the Union most often coincides with the "particular"' of the centre'. 44 The free movement of goods is therefore one of the fundamental 'universals' of the Union, which however serves disproportionately companies based in the 'old' Member States and does not allow challenging their marketing practices as price dumping (taking advantage of different price elasticity of demand in the 'old' and post-communist Europe. Post-communist Member States are not allowed to make up for such dumping, which leads to the loss of competitiveness of producers based there, through taking advantage of its competitive advantage -the cheap labour force -because social dumping is something to be prevented. This is not to fully agree with Damjan Kukovec, who came with a very sobering critique of the overwhelming diatribe against the ECJ's decisions in Viking and Laval 45 and introduced the above analysis to the EU legal discourse. Contrary to Kukovec 46 I still believe that it makes sense to think of such conflicts in terms of the 'fundamental contradiction' mentioned above and share 'the conclusion of progressive lawyers that what needs to be fought is "the market" or "the goal of free competition"'. 47 Explaining why would require more space and would essentially entail replying to Kukovec, but I would like to a recent observation made by Wolfgang Streeck: 'I do not believe we can speak meaningfully about the future of democracy, in Europe or elsewhere, without at the same time speaking about the future of capitalism. Put otherwise, we cannot do democratic theory without political economy'. 48 To me this means to analyse the notion of the market and free competition in constitutionalist terms, something that some people have started to do also in Europe, 49 and not abandoning the concepts altogether.
The role of supranational legality : is it compatible with constitutional democracy?
Coming to the point regarding my idealisation of constitutional courts, on a closer look Dani's critique is not so much about them. The key critique concerns the very notion of national constitutional democracy, and its confrontation with a new type of legality developed in the post-war era. After the bourgeois formal legality, which helped to liberate 19 th century liberals and capitalist entrepreneurs from feudalism, and welfare constitutional legality that sought to address the social question raised by socialists in the aftermath of laissez-faire capitalism, supranational legality is established to enhance 'constitutional democracies by coping with their structural deficiencies', 50 which consist in their 'inbuilt tendency of sanctifying national communities and their particular conception of the human order' and their susceptibility 'to capture by vested interests and exclusion of outsiders'. 51 More controversially, supranational legality serves what Dani calls 'advanced liberalism agenda' -'boosting the competitiveness of national economies by countering vested interests'. 52 Dani's account of the EU developed throughout much of his recent work 53 is remarkably richer (and in my view far more accurate) characterization of the point of European integration than the one, which sees the Union only as an external constraint that complements internal mechanisms with supranational ones. 54 The EU is quite a powerful enabling force, in the sense that its government structures allow the adoption of policies that would be hardly achievable at the level of the nation state.
Crucially, these are policies that a European nation state could not implement not only for reasons of their scale and scope, such as the Europe-wide common market or environmental protection, but also -and more importantly -because such policies would have been opposed by the domestic electorate. Chris Bickerton argues in this vein that 'the turn to member statehood' was part of the strategy 'to change public expectations and to demobilize those societal actors for whom national Keynesianism had become the natural policy choice'. 55 Monetarist emphasis on price stability won over the Keynesian objective of full employment and the external devaluation of currency ceased to be available to national governments, which would have sought to regain international competitiveness in this way. Moreover, in the context of European market integration, exchange rate stability became a goal in itself, forcing the Member States to bind themselves to various cooperative mechanisms, which predated the establishment of the EMU in 1993. 56 Bickerton also shows how the transformation of the European nation states into the EU Member States helped to lower the expectations that people had from the state -to the point that today the state is not seen as an achievement of freedom understood as the ability to codetermine with others the conditions of one's life but an obstacle to it. Freedom is thus reduced to negative freedom from interference -and institutions of collective selfdetermination (the state, but also labour unions), which are crucial to what is often called 'social freedom' seen with suspicion. Individuals can of course cooperate, but they do so mainly through private contracts in the market place, not through political action in the public sphere. 57 Now we may praise all this if we agreed with the kind of policies pursued by the EU Member States since the 1970s, but the question is whether European peoples actually want such policies. The only mechanism to find out is through politics that takes place in the framework of constitutional democracy and that is precisely what we lack today in the EU. It is largely constrained at the national level and virtually non-existent at the level of the EU. National politics operates in the context where 'there is no alternative' -at least for some countries -to the economic model prescribed by the Treaties (and mutated in the context of the Eurocrisis). 58 The EU is then busy with creating fictions of actual politics (such as the presentation of the former prime minister of Luxembourg as the leader 'elected' by European citizens), 59 while 'keeping the people out (or from obstructing integration)' 60 -a familiar theme of the struggle for EU legitimacy since 1950, beautifully reconstructed by Claudia Schrag Sternberg.
The key question for both me and Marco Dani, 61 I suspect, is whether the transformation of European nation states into EU Member States has been a legitimate process and whether the price the former had to pay for it was not too high. The question of whether the displacement of constitutional courts was worth it is just part of this larger and much more important question. It asks, essentially, what the legitimate form of political rule in Europe is and whether constitutional democracy can coexist with supranational integration. Dani finds promising a mix of constitutional democracy and intergovernmental-technocratic regulation, while I think that constitutional democracy needs to be extended to comprise both the Member States (qua states) 62 and the Union.
At this point I think it is important to avoid a false dichotomy between on the one hand an idealised notion of constitutional democracy, existing at the level of the nation state, 63 and on the other hand the EU (and other supranational projects, such as the ECHR), presented in supposedly realistic, cold and rather unattractive terms. It may well be that the very establishment and sustained existence of national constitutional democracies in the post-war years was possible only thanks to European integration. In other words, it is plausible to say that today's Germany has constitutional democracy now admired by some only because shortly after the War it participated in European supranational structures, and similar things can be said about post-communist states that joined the EU much later. 64 Too many accounts of the legitimacy crisis of the EU take the view that there once was a fully democratic European nation state, which was somewhat lost or dismantled on its way to become the member of the EU. It is important to ask a different question: does the EU today make the rule over the people of its Member States more legitimate than their being ruled without the Union? 65 Interestingly, Bickerton believes that the latter is true through his open support of Brexit 66 -which should be taken seriously by anyone concerned with democracy in Europe.
Where the action lies: ordinary courts
Finally, given the constraints of space, I would like to offer a much briefer reaction to Dani's invitation to 'an appraisal of the potential inherent in the preliminary reference procedure, namely the possibility for courts (and the other actors involved) to voice arguments based on national constitutional law and, critically, to have them considered by the Court of Justice'. 67 In my view each kind of legality identified above requires its own institution: whereas this seems still uncontroversial for supranational legality promoted by supranational courts, the separation of formal legality, which in my view has its place in ordinary courts, and constitutional legality to be located in constitutional (or supreme) courts seems rather outdated. Blurring the lines between the two seems to be the hallmark of what is called the 'new constitutionalism', which has triumphed on both sides of the Atlantic after the War. The action must come from ordinary courts, which in my view should be much more constrained in challenging the separation of both kinds of legality.
This in my view will ultimately preserve not only constitutional court's place in constitutional democracies, but also the authority of ordinary courts, which in my view does not rest on democracy or public reason (now popular grounds for judicial legitimacy in the academic literature), but on formal legality. This is a point, however, requiring a much longer argument than this short reply allows.
